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Iranian Receptivity to CIA Propaganda in 1953 
 
By Alex Ponce 
 
 
 
Abstract: In 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), together with 
the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), organized a coup to 
overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadeq (1882-1967). While much has been written about the coup, 
little attention has been given to the U.S. propaganda that preceded the 
operation. From 1950 to 1953, the U.S. launched a series of propaganda 
campaigns in Iran. Drawing from U.S.-Iranian correspondences, 
memoirs, journal articles, and secondary sources, this paper seeks to 
shed light on the U.S. and CIA perceptions of Iranian receptivity to 
propaganda from 1950 to 1953. What did CIA officials like Kermit 
Roosevelt and Donald Wilber learn from this coup and why did they 
consider it a success? What were Henry F. Grady’s perceptions of the 
effects these propaganda tactics would create and why were they ignored 
or silenced? Going beyond our understanding of the coup and the 
reasons for why it was carried out, this research will deepen and enrich 
our knowledge of U.S. interventionist policies and the blowback that can 
come as a result of those policies. 
 
 
 
Part 1 – Introduction and Historical Context 
 
In 1948, the Iranian parliament rejected a Russian oil concession in 
northern Iran.1 The National Front, the party to which Mohammad 
Mosaddeq belonged, and representatives who sympathized with the 
British were worried about Russian influence in Iran and they were the 
major opponents of the concession.2 Not to be outdone, the 
representatives who sympathized with Russia’s effort for an oil 
concession called for a bill to terminate the 1933 oil contract between 
Britain and Iran. While the proposal was immediately rejected by British 
sympathizers, Mossadeq and the National Front only opposed the bill at 
first.3 In 1949, however, Mossadeq and the nationalists would  
reintroduce the proposal after they opposed the Supplemental Oil 
agreement, which was to increase royalties from oil to Iran from 17 to 24 
 
 
1 Ervand Abrahamian, “The 1953 Coup in Iran,” Science and Society 65, no. 2 
(2001). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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percent.4 Mossadeq and the nationalists were not content with the 
proposal, especially because it did not address what they considered to be 
the country’s most important grievances. This momentum sparked the 
effort to nationalize Iran’s oil. 
After the assassination of Prime Minister Ali Razmara on March 
7, 1951, the push for nationalization was underway. In fact, the Majlis 
passed a bill the next day authorizing the nationalization of Iran’s oil. 
Mohammad Mosaddeq was elected prime minister in April and in May 
he declared all AIOC assets nationalized, cancelling the company’s oil 
concession.5 To enforce the new law, the Majlis sent deputies to Abadan, 
where the largest AIOC refinery was located, marking the beginning of 
the dispute.6 
Since the beginning of the oil dispute, there were always two 
very different perspectives on the issue. On one side, the Iranians 
articulated their political right to control their country’s assets and based 
it on their desire for national independence from foreign influence.7 The 
British, however, viewed Iran’s effort to nationalize their oil as a breach 
of contract, calling out Iran on disrespect for the AIOC and Britain’s 
controlling stock of the company.8 What Mossadeq and the nationalists 
were concerned about was not so much the royalties, or lack thereof, that 
they were receiving from the AIOC, but rather the control over the oil 
industry process, everything from extraction to distribution.9 The British, 
in turn, saw the nationalist desire for control as a direct threat to their 
position as a world power.10 In their effort to maintain control of Iran’s 
oil, Britain arranged for a Western boycott, which delivered a devastating 
blow to Iran’s economy.11 
In the midst of this dispute, the United States (under the Truman 
administration) stepped in as mediator between Britain and Iran. Mary 
Ann Heiss, a U.S. foreign relations scholar, would argue that the role that 
Orientalism played in US-Iranian relations was more important than U.S. 
intervention in the dispute. According to Edward Said, Orientalism is a 
 
 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), 266. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Mary Ann Heiss, “Real Men Don’t Wear Pajamas: Anglo-American Cultural 
Perceptions of Mohammad Mossadeq and the Iranian Oil Nationalization 
Dispute,” in Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World 
Since 1945, ed. Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio: Ohio State University 
Press, 2001). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Abrahamian. 
11 Mark J Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004). 
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Western perception of the people and culture of the Orient, heavily 
infused with notions of Western superiority of lifestyle and culture.12 
Heiss argues that this Orientalist view played a heavy hand in the 
eventual orchestration of the coup, stating that, “the end result of 
orientalization of Mossadeq was an increasingly rigid Anglo-American 
position on the oil crisis that eschewed compromise or concessions and 
ultimately saw removing him from office as the only acceptable course  
of action.”13 As a note on the topic, Orientalism is often assumed to be 
based on prejudice or racism and that the Orientalism that Heiss refers to 
did not necessarily come from racial prejudice. While it is tempting to 
assume racism on behalf of the United States and Great Britain, Ervand 
Abrahamian explains that the pervasiveness of this Orientalist perception 
came not as a result of prejudice, but “because of the clash of economic 
interests between imperialism and nationalism.”14 
After numerous attempts to negotiate a settlement between 
Britain and Iran, the United States under the Eisenhower administration 
opted to use covert action. The 1953 coup, under the supervision of Allen 
W. Dulles (1893-1969), would become the first covert operation by the 
CIA. As part of the effort to carry out the coup, propaganda projects 
were actively used to set the stage. These tactics were carried out with 
the intent to influence politics and society in a way that would create 
hostility toward the nationalists and, more specifically, Mohammad 
Mossadeq. 
 
 
 
Part 2 – The Content and Purpose of Propaganda 
 
When considering U.S. propaganda abroad, it is important to remember 
that the history changed significantly in 1948. During the First and 
Second World Wars, there were already limited international information 
exchange services being carried out as war measures.15 In times of peace, 
however, the United States had generally opposed government 
propaganda and information services, both domestic and foreign. Burton 
Paulu, who wrote extensively on the Smith-Mundt Act (1948), a law that 
dealt specifically with dissemination of propaganda abroad, gave several 
reasons for the delay in government broadcasting: (1) the U.S. had no 
incentive to promote propaganda, (2) the U.S. was not politically isolated 
like Russia, (3) there was no U.S. system of colonies to bind together,  
and (4) the privately owned radio broadcasters were opposed to 
 
 
12 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
13 Heiss. 
14 Abrahamian. 
15 Burton Paulu, “The Smith-Mundt Act: A Legislative History,” Journalism 
Quarterly (1953). 
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government broadcasting out of fear that they would not be able to 
compete.16 When anti-American propaganda from Germany and Italy in 
the 1930s was being disseminated, however, the U.S. reluctantly and 
gradually began to respond.17 
After World War II and during the Cold War, propaganda 
became entrenched in an anti-Soviet and anti-communist agenda. More 
importantly, it became a critical component of U.S. foreign policy. 
Pitting Western powers against the Soviet Union and its allies, U.S. 
foreign policy became much more about containment and isolation. As 
Richard W. Cottam noted in his work, the geographic location of Iran, 
being that it shared a border with the Soviet Union and was essentially a 
gateway into other Middle Eastern countries, was of primary concern for 
the United States.18As learned in the previous section, Iran was also an 
important source of oil for the West. 
Due to anti-communism becoming the dominant structure of 
U.S. foreign policy, the need to strategically spread Western ideas was 
addressed in Congress. In 1947, Senator H. Alexander Smith (1880- 
1966) and Representative Karl Mundt (1900-1974) presented a study of 
the ideological state of Europe and the Middle East. The study concluded 
that the United States was losing what they called the “battle of ideas.” In 
response to this crisis, congress approved a counter-communist, 
propaganda program called the U.S.I.E., formally known as the Smith- 
Mundt Act of 1948.19 For the first time in history, the new law authorized 
the use of U.S. propaganda activity abroad and gave the State  
Department permission to conduct cultural and informational exchange 
programs on a long term basis.20 Interestingly, the legislation did not 
permit the program to use propaganda in the United States.21 
The USIE program made its way to Iran in the 1950s through a 
short term ambassador named Henry F. Grady. A close friend of George 
McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African 
affairs, Henry F. Grady had previous experience with propaganda 
projects in Greece and was sent by Secretary of State Dean Acheson to 
direct the USIE program in Iran .22 Grady was a staunch anti-communist, 
anti-imperialist, and firm supporter of Iranian nationalism. His vision for 
 
 
 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran: Updated through 1978 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, c.1979) 
19 United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 
402, § 2 (1948). 
20 Paulu. 
21 United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. 
22 Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of 
Middle East Terror (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 86-87. 
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the USIE in Iran was not only to fend off the influence of the Soviet 
Union but to assist in the social and economic improvement of Iran. 
Much like Richard Cottam, Ambassador Grady understood the 
importance of the strategic location of Iran and the value of its national 
resource. In his memoirs he states that: 
 
Iran is on the periphery of Russia and is important not 
only because of its strategic location but also because it 
has extraordinarily valuable natural resources…Iran is 
the corridor through which the Soviets could move into 
the Middle East, to Africa, to Pakistan, India, and 
Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union needs the great oil 
resources of this area to achieve its ambitions of world 
domination. Iran is therefore strategic in both a 
geographic and raw material sense.23 
 
Based on this assessment, we can conclude that two of Grady’s main 
concerns were securing the borders and oil fields of Iran and preventing 
Soviet encroachment. In order to accomplish this, Grady proposed that 
the propaganda tactics that were to be used in Iran needed to be 
concentrated in areas where Iranians were most susceptible. For Grady, 
the most susceptible places were ones with the poorest economic 
conditions, and therefore it should not come as surprise that he would 
target both urban and rural populations where economic conditions were 
in that state .24 
Assisted by Edward C. Wells, another state department official, 
Grady put together a plan in Tehran and delivered it to the Department of 
State.25 In a correspondence to the Department of State in July of 1950, 
Grady listed his objectives for the program: 
 
Objective: To ensure that Iranians are informed about 
and understand U.S. policy, particularly with regard to 
the following: 
a.) Extending the effectiveness of U.S. support for Iran’s 
security and the assurance that “Iran does not stand 
alone.” 
b.) Providing monetary aid to Iran. 
 
 
 
23 Henry F. Grady, The Memoirs of Ambassador Henry F. Grady: From the 
Great War to the Cold War (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 159. 
24 Ibid., 140. 
25 Henry F. Grady and Edward C. Wells, Proposed New Program for USIE, Iran 
(Washington D.C.: 1950), Document 6, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20006.pdf 
. 
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c.) Firmness toward USSR and determination to prevent 
further encroachment on free nations. 
d.) U.S. is anti-imperialist, has no colonial aspirations, 
and determined that each nation has the right to work out 
its destiny. 
e.) The free world is an interrelated whole with mutual 
interests.26 
 
We can see in this plan that Grady put heavy emphasis on building an 
amicable relationship between the U.S. and Iran. In order to achieve this 
goal, Grady suggested that Iranians need to be informed about U.S. 
policy and convince them that it holds Iran’s best interest. By “best 
interest,” Grady was referring to the security of the country from the 
USSR and the financial assistance for economic autonomy. Further into 
the correspondence, Grady lists the methods by which each objective 
would be met, including the introduction of U.S. material into Iran’s 
educational system, the promotion and use of U.S. materials, motion 
pictures, exhibits, pamphlets, radio programming, branch offices at 
consulates, establishing libraries, and the training of Iranians to maintain 
all these programs.27 
Without belaboring the agenda that Grady set out, we can 
understand his intentions with the information at hand. As time passed, 
Grady sent more correspondences to Washington to update the State 
Department on what he perceived to be a successful campaign. In an 
October 1950 correspondence to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
evidence can be found of Grady’s perception of Iranian receptivity of 
U.S. propaganda. According to the correspondence, the Iranian 
Propaganda department, which the USIE used to operate discreetly, was 
taking an “increasingly anti-communist pro-American line; the 
impression created among general public is simply that American aid is 
here; mullahs in two mosques publically sermonizing against 
communists, which have been repeated by Iran radio; more anti- 
communist newspapers are starting up; and the ‘chins up Iran’ campaign 
is standing by to be released by press, radio, and posters.”28 As we can 
see from Grady’s assessment, his perception of Iranian receptivity to the 
covert actions of the USIE is a positive one, reinforced by the increase in 
anti-communist and pro-American activity. Even with regard to 
monetary aid, Grady is convinced that the general impression by the 
 
 
 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Henry F. Grady, U.S.-Iranian Joint Propaganda Efforts (Washington D.C.: 
1950), Document 10, 
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public is that America is here to help. This notion of success will be 
revisited when the propaganda campaigns move in a different direction. 
It was briefly mentioned earlier that radio broadcasts were one 
method of transmitting U.S. propaganda, but little explanation has been 
offered as to why radio propaganda was more important than other forms 
of dissemination. Unlike newspapers and other print materials, Iranian 
radio stations could reach a broader spectrum of society.29 A 1951 study 
of Iranian males concluded that there was a prevalent ideological  
division in newspaper choices, meaning right-leaning men would not 
read left-leaning newspapers and vice versa.30 Therefore, the use of print 
materials to propagandize Iranians was limited in its effects on an 
audience that was already committed to an ideology. In comparison to 
newspapers, radio broadcasting produced more effective results. As 
Mervyn Roberts would suggest, “physically controlling the stations in 
Iran was of greater importance to the overthrow of Mossadeq than the 
CIA propaganda program leading up to the coup, as station control 
disseminated messages farther.”31 
After the collapse of negotiations and the approval of the coup, 
CIA director Allen W. Dulles approved a one-million dollar budget for 
the Tehran Station, which could use the money in any way that would 
contribute to the fall of Mosaddeq .32 Often the radio programs that ran 
through Radio Tehran broadcasted messages that labeled Mosaddeq as a 
sympathizer of the Tudeh party, an enemy of Islam, and a fomenter of 
separatism.33 In addition to the anti-Mosaddeq messages, the station at 
times also ran pro-shah messages. Regardless of the stations’ approach, 
there was one consistency that seemed to resonate with all Iranians, 
Iranian nationalism. Any reference to Iran’s glorious secular past or anti- 
colonial stance was perceived by the CIA as much more receptive to the 
Iranian people.34 Even the competing radio stations that supported 
Mosaddeq attempted to sway public opinion by appealing to this 
notion.35 When carefully and strategically disseminated to the public, the 
CIA learned that anti-imperial and pro-Iranian messages could garner far 
more support than any other talking point they pushed on the radio. 
What is important to remember when assessing the success of 
this radio propaganda is that it did not operate inside of a vacuum. The 
CIA review after the coup, which was written by Dr. Donald Wilber, 
stresses the idea that the covert propaganda tactics used did not directly 
 
 
29 Mervyn Roberts. "Analysis of Radio Propaganda in the 1953 Iran 
Coup." Iranian Studies 45 (2012): 759-777. 
30 Ibid., 759 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, 761. 
33 Ibid, 762. 
34 Ibid, 777. 
35 Ibid. 
111  
Iranian Receptivity to CIA Propaganda in 1953  
 
 
 
lead to the success of the coup.36 There were times when the CIA was 
limited in their ability to insert propaganda in Iranian media and there 
were times when the CIA’s efforts backfired. Wilber makes reference to 
a post-operation, CIA study in Newsweek magazine, which described the 
overall effort of the CIA as a “relatively ineffectual venture” and that 
there was room for “improvement of capabilities.”37 In the end, the 
effectiveness of propaganda was a matter of trial and error on behalf of 
CIA operatives, who had to learn the complex media culture in order to 
mobilize and direct latent passions at critical moments.38 Often what 
factored into success were the actions of Mosaddeq and the Tudeh 
combined with controlled radio broadcasting, which swayed public 
opinion to oppose Mossadeq in the end.39 
 
 
 
Part 3 – Comparing Perceptions Before and After 1953 
 
After the nationalization of oil in 1951, Henry F. Grady was replaced as 
Ambassador to Iran by Loy Henderson. The decision to replace him 
came partially as a result of the bad relationship that Grady developed 
with Dean Acheson. Also, Grady was increasingly outspoken about the 
United States’ dealings with Britain on Iran. The coming of Henderson 
and the dismissal of Grady foreshadows a very significant shift in the 
direction of foreign policy in Iran and consequently the propaganda used 
for its implementation. 
One of the main concerns that the U.S. had about the 
nationalization of oil was the opportunity it might give the Soviet Union 
to exert influence on Iran’s distribution. If they could not get Iran to 
come to an agreement with Britain it would threaten “the free flow of 
Iranian oil into the economy of the free world,” as President Truman 
would say.40 At the same time, the U.S. did not want to appear to be 
completely partial to the British side on this issue. As Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson wrote to the U.S. embassy in Tehran, “while in general 
the U.S. does not favor nationalization, U.S. recognizes the right of 
sovereign states to nationalize provided prompt payment for just 
 
 
 
 
36 Donald Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952- 
August 1953 (Washington D.C., March 1954), 85, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/#documents. 
37 Ibid, 86. 
38 Mervyn, 777 
39 Ibid. 
40 “President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee (No 25),” in Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1952-1954 vol X Iran 1951-1954 (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
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compensation is made.”41 Interestingly, the Secretary of State did not 
want to make this policy pubic because there was genuine concern that 
other nations might want to nationalize their oil as well. These 
circumstances subsequently put the U.S. in a difficult situation for next 
two years, resulting in the eventual siding with British policy. 
If anyone could see the dangerous consequences that would 
result from siding with the British on this oil issue it was Henry Grady. 
In a letter to the State Department Grady wrote “it is my strong 
conviction that British policy has been and is one that may lead to 
disaster in this country [Iran]. If we decide to let them call all the plays, 
we will absorb a large part of the present deep antagonism toward the 
British.”42 Grady considered British policy to be imperialist, using 
economic pressure in an effort to maintain control, and if the U.S. sided 
with Britain it would essentially support the same practices. Out of 
disillusion and frustration, he resigned from his post in September 1951 
and left Iran. 
Since the U.S. and Britain were getting nowhere close to 
reaching a settlement with Iran, talks of overthrowing Mossedeq and 
reinstating the shah increased. In an effort to accomplish that goal, a 
continuation and modification of the propaganda tactics that were 
already in place went into effect. As we will see in the subsequent 
paragraphs, the shah will become a much more important component, 
more discrepancy will be used, and the target audiences of propaganda 
will change. 
In a November 21, 1951, correspondence between Loy 
Henderson and Dean Acheson, Henderson addresses the need to shield 
Iranian press and public from criticism of U.S. press regarding Iranian 
attitude in the oil dispute.43 Instead, he suggests that Voice of America 
(VOA), a U.S. run international radio show, transmit U.S. press and 
public criticism of Prime Minster Mossadeq’s oil policy.44 He argues that 
this would be wiser because it would “convey the idea that the U.S. is 
generally sympathetic with Iranian aspirations for full economic and 
political independence but inclined to think that Iranians have allowed 
themselves to be swept by emotions into a position which puts them in 
 
41 “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt (No. 10),” in Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1952-1954 vol. X Iran 1951-1954 (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 27. 
42 “The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Department of Sate (No. 77),” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954 vol. X Iran 1951-1954 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 149. 
43 Loy Henderson and Dean Acheson, Iranian Oil Policy (Washington D.C.: 
1951) Document 41, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20041.pdf 
. 
44 Ibid. 
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light unfair to themselves and renders it extremely difficult for their 
American friends to aid them without appearing to approve of their 
somewhat rash actions and rather unreasoning attitude.”45 Henderson  
then went on to say that the Iranians would also be assured that the U.S. 
understands the “Iranian position for urging Britain to also show more 
flexibility.”46 The most important part of the correspondence is in the last 
sentence, however, where Henderson makes mention of the Shah saying 
“we deem it equally helpful for VOA programs, whenever appropriate, to 
indicate the desires of people in the U.S. to help Iranian people in every 
possible way and to make a friendly reference to the Shah as their 
progressive leader.” 
Most correspondences prior to this one by Henderson made little 
mention, if any, of the Shah, much less as a “progressive leader.” What 
begins to be seen in 1952 is a more repeated mention of the Shah. For 
example, in an April 28, 1952, correspondence between Edward C. Wells 
and Ambassador Henderson, Wells outlined a new propaganda plan for 
Iran. It was still based on much of the same objectives that were in place 
two years earlier, (e.g. anti-communism, anti-Soviet) but their priorities 
had changed in regards to who this propaganda was targeting. In his  
letter to Henderson, Wells stated that the target audience for U.S. direct 
anti-communist propaganda are: 
 
1. The Shah, Royal Court, and wealthy landowners. 
2. University professors and students, secondary school teachers 
and students, professional men, including government 
employees. 
3. Leaders of public opinion amongst illiterate masses, Mullahs, 
village headmen, tribal chiefs, etc. 
4. Labor leaders and army officers.47 
 
Wells argued that this “conservative group [the Shah, his court, and 
landowners] is vitally interested in preserving Iran’s integrity, which if 
they could be stirred to more positive action would represent the  
strongest possible rallying point for all anti-communist elements. By 
reason of the strength of their position, they should be able to orient the 
country toward our direction.”48 Wells then listed the secondary target 
groups, such as students and laborers, making mention of their higher 
susceptibility to Soviet influence while claiming that they represented the 
 
 
 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Edward C. Wells, IIA: Country Plan (Washington D.C.: 1952), Document 60, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20060.pdf 
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“public opinion molders.”49 It is ironic that Wells would say that these 
groups are at most risk of being influenced by communism and still  
argue that if the Shah, his court, and the wealthy elite “could be stirred to 
more positive action would represent the strongest possible rallying point 
for all anti-communist elements.”50 The point that being made here is 
that, for whatever reason, a greater deal of importance was being placed 
on the Shah, especially when it came to who the USIE thought would be 
most receptive to U.S. propaganda. 
When the U.S. and Britain finally decided to replace Mosaddeq 
with General Fazullah Zahedi, a massive propaganda campaign was 
organized to create and enhance public hostility towards Mosaddeq and 
the government by manufacturing the belief that Mosaddeq was 
sympathetic to communism. Putting aside the military success or failure 
of the coup, the CIA thought the worst result that the propaganda 
campaign could produce was instability for Mosaddeq. As per Wilber’s 
post-operation report, even if the operation failed, the dissemination of 
propaganda would at least make the “the position of Mosaddeq 
increasingly vulnerable and unsteady.”51 Therefore, we can conclude that 
the purpose of propaganda just prior to the coup was ultimately to create 
instability. 
The themes of the propaganda were very similar to the ones used 
when Grady was still ambassador. The difference, however, was that one 
of the main themes of this campaign was convincing the public that 
Mosaddeq was a communist and that he had close ties with the Tudeh.52 
Following in line with this theme was spreading the idea that he was 
dealing directly with the Soviets and that he was planning on 
surrendering the Northern provinces to the Soviet Union.53 In addition to 
this false accusation, Mosaddeq was blamed for any downturn in the 
economy.54 One new line of slant that was added to the collection, 
however, was that Mosaddeq “had become the unwitting victim of his 
unscrupulous personally ambitious advisors.”55 In other words, he was 
becoming corrupt and dictatorial. 
To fuel anti-Mosaddeq sentiment, the CIA also targeted religious 
leaders. Using false information, also known as black propaganda, 
attempts to rally their support were carried out spontaneously. For 
example, CIA agents would send fake statements from the Tudeh 
threatening religious leaders with severe punishment if the party learned 
 
 
 
49 Ibid.   
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54 Ibid.   
55 Ibid. 
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of any opposition to Mosaddeq.56 Some agents even wanted to carry out 
terrorist attacks on a massive scale. In fact, details in the original plan 
included that, “on the appointed day, staged attacks will be made against 
respected religious leaders in Tehran.”57 The attacks would then be 
supplemented with “U.S. station fabricated documents which prove and 
record in detail a secret agreement between Mosaddeq and the Tudeh, 
with the latter promising to use all their force in support of Mossadeq  
and against the religious leaders, the army, and the police”.58 These plans 
reveal the CIA’s perception of religious leaders, which was that by 
continuously tying Mosaddeq to the Tudeh and instilling fear in these 
leaders, they could rally religious Iranians to the cause. By promoting 
divisions, the CIA made considerable strides in loosening Mosaddeq’s 
support base, especially the religious nationalists who were once on his 
side. 
As mentioned previously, perhaps one of the most interesting 
developments at this point was the addition of a separate propaganda 
campaign that would invite the Shah to step up to the task. As Stephen 
Kinzer would remind us, the Shah was reluctant to comply with the U.S. 
and Britain. The Shah thought that unless they assured him that both 
governments would offer their complete support, he would not go  
through with the plan.59 Dr. Wilber recounts in his report the frustration 
on behalf of the CIA in dealing with the Shah because of his “entrenched 
attitude of vacillation and indecision.”60 Over time his personal defenses 
would fall and his compliance would be won. It can be argued that more 
than anything the Shah was forced to comply, especially when the U.S. 
and Britain threatened to do whatever necessary to prevent communist 
intrusion. To add to the threat, the U.S. and Britain also made it clear that 
if anything went wrong with the operation, he would face the 
repercussions and his dynasty would undoubtedly come to an end. 
More importantly, this pressure on the Shah helps us understand 
why the propaganda campaign changed priorities in terms of its target 
audience. The Shah, the royal court, and the wealthy elite were targeted 
directly and indirectly to ensure not only that they would cooperate with 
the CIA and SIS, but to become convinced that the operation served their 
best interests. What this reveals is that the CIA and Britain perceived that 
the top tier of Iranian could be persuaded, whether it was by force or by 
threat. 
After overthrowing of Mossadeq, the CIA and their Iranian 
collaborators were still entrusted to continue a propaganda campaign to 
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return stability and retain a friendly image for the West. In September of 
1953, Edward C. Wells, who was still heavily involved, laid out new 
recommendations for the propaganda projects to come. Wells makes it a 
priority to say that “‘allaying Iranian distrust’ should not be 
overstressed.”61 It seems that the embassy and the USIE did not want to 
overdue their efforts to regain Iranian trust. Otherwise, they would begin 
to look more suspicious of their involvement in the coup. Among the 
recommendations that Wells made to the new Secretary of State, he 
suggested that the media use themes that stress “coordination and 
cooperation of Shah and Zahedi, which would benefit Iran; the Shah and 
Zahedi’s progressive social programs; and the praising of the August 19 
events.”62 
Dr. Donald Wilber and Kermit Roosevelt shared similar views 
about the success of the operation, especially with regard to the 
propaganda. In the final chapter of his report, Wilber said of the work 
done with the press that, 
 
In July and early August every segment of the press with 
which we or the U.K. had working relations went all out 
against Mosaddeq. As judged by the public reactions on 
the days following 16 August, there can be no doubt 
whatsoever that this campaign had reached a very large 
audience and had directly influenced their thinking in a 
most positive way. A separate analysis of this press 
operation should be made to serve as a basic guidance in 
mounting future campaigns.63 
 
Based on this excerpt, we can argue that Wilber not only thought that the 
propaganda was successful but exemplary as well. The last sentence is 
especially significant. Prior to this operation, there was no discussion of 
adopting these tactics and using them in other circumstances. Although 
Wilber was not necessarily suggesting that there would be another coup 
in the near future, he knew that the propaganda plans used in this 
operation could be used as a guide. About year after TPAJAX, in 1954, 
the CIA would perform another coup in Guatemala, where propaganda 
played a very similar role. 
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Kermit Roosevelt’s view of success was based on what he called 
a correct assessment of the situation and the people they contracted for 
the job. In the final page of Countercoup, he says, 
 
We were successful in this venture because our 
assessment of the situation in Iran was correct. We 
believed—and we were proven right—that if the people 
and the armed forces were shown that they must choose, 
that Mosaddeq was forcing them to choose, between 
their monarch and a revolutionary figure backed by the 
Soviet Union, they could, and would, make only one 
choice. With some help from us, but mostly because of 
Mosaddeq, the Tudeh and eventually the USSR itself, 
forced the choice upon them, the populace made a 
choice. And most convincingly. The people and the  
army came, overwhelmingly, to the support of the Shah. 
You can have no idea from here—you really had to be in 
Iran—of the heartfelt strength of that support.64 
 
As we can see in his statement, Roosevelt thought that the success of the 
coup was based on the fact that people wanted Mosaddeq out and the 
Shah back in. This idea stands in stark contrast to some of the most basic 
facts about Mosaddeq and his popularity. While it is true that 
Mosaddeq’s support base was not always cohesive, there is evidence to 
suggest that he was still more popular than the Shah. Henry Grady once 
pointed out that, “Mosaddeq had the backing of 95 to 98 percent of the 
people of his country.”65 Granted, this was before the operation 
commenced, but it is difficult to suggest that this base entirely fell apart 
because of artificially created uprisings and propaganda. Roosevelt 
argued that because the coup was successful, however, his assessment 
(and the CIA’s assessment) about the people’s attitude toward Mosaddeq 
were correct. Further in the chapter, he went on to say, “if our analysis 
had been wrong, we’d have fallen flat on our faces. But it was right.”66 
Just like Wilber, Roosevelt thought that, “if we, the CIA, are ever going 
to try something like this again, we must be absolutely sure that the 
people and army want what we want.”67 When he was offered the 
opportunity to lead the Guatemalan operation, however, he turned it 
down. 
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According to the State Department, there were three main 
propaganda problems that the U.S. faced after deposing the prime 
minster: (1) a charge that the U.S. had a hand in deposing Mosaddeq, (2) 
a charge that Zahedi was a U.S. puppet, and (3) the myth that Mosaddeq 
was the Iranian grand man.”68 To address these issues, the State 
Department made it their policy to deny their involvement in foreign 
domestic affairs. To prove their point, National Security Council 5428 
(NSC 5428) was sent to all psychological programs in the Middle East, 
asking them to include the following in their agenda: 
 
Convince local leaders and peoples that the age of 
Western Imperialism is over; and that Western positions 
are being willingly readjusted in an enlightened manner 
and with full respect for the national independence of 
sovereign equality of the Near Eastern states as rapidly 
as the interests of security allow.69 
 
Contrary to what the policy states, the 1953 coup was still an act of 
imperialism, albeit a subtle one. 
 
 
 
Part 4 – Conclusion 
 
Since the beginning of the oil crisis, it was clear that securing Western 
control over Iran’s oil supply was a top priority of both Great Britain and 
the United States. Subsequently, the decision to go forward with the coup 
was based on this premise, which runs contrary to the common 
knowledge that Cold War geopolitics was the main reason for 
overthrowing Mosaddeq. Although there is no reason to doubt that Cold 
War politics played some part in the decision, it was not the primary 
reason for interfering in Iran’s internal politics. For this reason, the 
United States used propaganda to affect public opinion and stir up anti- 
Mosaddeq sentiment. 
The United States and Great Britain got everything they wanted 
from the 1953 coup, including the denationalization of oil. Additionally, 
they kept the Shah as an ally, as compliant with their agenda in the 
region. The blowback of this operation, however, would come in the 
form of anti-American sentiment, boiling over in the 1979 revolution. 
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When the revolution came, the monarchy was toppled and the ties to 
Western interests were cut off. Essentially, the coup backfired over time, 
and greatly damaged Iranian trust in the United States. 
While CIA officials like Wilber and Roosevelt saw immediate 
success and gain from the operation, Grady saw the long term 
consequences that coup would bring to Iran and the United States. He 
warned the coup would be “utter folly” and that it would push Iran into 
“a status of disintegration with all that implies.”70 And although Grady 
was outspoken about the U.S. and Great Britain’s policy, his assessments 
were ultimately ignored, resulting in his reassignment. Richard Cottam, 
who was also a close observer of the coup and its aftermath, had a  
similar assessment to that of Grady. His post-1953 assessment of the 
coup was that “U.S. policy did change Iran’s history in a fundamental 
way…In helping eliminate a government that symbolized Iran’s search 
for national integrity and dignity, it helped deny the successor regime 
nationalist legitimacy.”71 
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